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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lainey Gonzalez appealed from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision
that reversed the magistrate court’s granting of her motion to suppress. On appeal, Ms.
Gonzalez asserted that the district court erred in reversing the trial court’s order because
the district court did so on a theory that was not presented before the trial court and was
affirmatively disavowed by the State in the course of litigating the motion to suppress. In
response, the State has asserted that the record on appeal was incomplete and therefore this
Court should affirm on that basis, that the State had sufficiently preserved its argument
before the trial court, and finally that application of the “right result, wrong theory” doctrine
is appropriate under the facts of this case.
This Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State’s contentions.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously set forth in Ms.
Gonzalez’s Appellant’s Brief. She will not reiterate them within this brief but incorporates
this Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings by reference.
ISSUE

Did the district court err on intermediate appeal from the trial court by considering and
deciding the case upon an argument that the State has previously disavowed before the trial
court?
1

ARGUMENT

I.

The District Court Erred On Intermediate Appeal By Considering And Deciding The
Case Upon An Argument That The State Has Previously Disavowed Before The Trial
Court.
A.

Clarification Regarding The Standard Of Review On Appeal From A District
Court Sitting In An Intermediate Appellate Capacity

Before addressing the substance of the State’s contentions on appeal, the Idaho Supreme
Court has very recently addressed and refined the standard of appellate review on an intermediate
appeal where the district court reverses, rather than affirms, the magistrate court. Prior opinions
made clear that appellate review following an intermediate appeal from magistrate to district court
reviewed the decision of the district court directly as a matter of procedure, but also focused on
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court in doing so. See, e.g., State v. Dacey,
169 Idaho 102, 491 P.3d 1205, 1210 (2021). The review of the findings of the magistrate is limited
to the question of whether there was evidence in the record too support them, and there is typically
deference paid to these findings. Id. However, the Idaho Supreme Court very recently announced
a slightly modified standard that applies to this Court’s review when the district court reverses,
rather than affirms, the magistrate court. In such cases, the reviewing court owes, “no particular
deference to the district court’s decision in cases like this one, where the district court reversed the
magistrate court.” Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Eddins, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___, 2021
WL 3890558, *4 (2021)1.
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Because the Idaho Supreme Court in Medical Recovery Services is so recent, and has not yet
been released for publication in the permanent law reports as of the writing of this Reply Brief, it
may be subject to further revision or withdrawal.
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B.

Any Prior Omissions From The Record On Appeal Have Been Cured By Ms.
Gonzalez And The Augmented Materials From The Trial Record Support Her
Position On Appeal

In its Respondent’s Brief, the State noted the absence of two documents from the Clerk’s
Record in this appeal: the initial briefing that the State filed before the trial court in opposition to
Ms. Gonzalez’s motion to suppress, and the supplemental briefing filed by the State after the
hearing on this motion. In response to the State’s argument, Ms. Gonzalez filed a Motion to
Augment with the Idaho Supreme Court that included these documents, which Motion was granted
by the Idaho Supreme Court on September 7, 2021. See Order Granting Motion to Augment the
Record.
Idaho Appellate Rule 30 expressly permits a party to cure any omission from the record by
seeking to augment the missing document or transcript into the record on appeal. This includes
those instances where the State, through its argument on appeal, puts a defendant on notice as to
the items that are missing from the appellate record. See State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct.
App. 1999) (noting that the state, by its argument on appeal, “put appellant’s counsel on notice
that the necessary transcript was missing”, but further noting that, “counsel failed to move to
augment the record as provided by I.A.R. 30.”) Ms. Gonzalez has heeded the standards set forth
for curing any deficiency in the record, and the Idaho Supreme Court has granted her motion to
augment to include the State’s written briefing before the trial court regarding her motion to
suppress.
Further, a review of the documents augmented into the record only served to strengthen
Ms. Gonzalez’s contentions on appeal that the district court erred by considering and reversing the
trial court under a theory that was disavowed by the State in its argument before the trial court. In
3

its Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support, the
State limited its argument to whether there was reasonable suspicion that Ms. Gonzalez violated
traffic laws for failure to maintain a traffic lane under I.C. § 49-637(1). (Aug. R., pp.1-3.) Notably,
this memorandum summarizes the State’s argument in its conclusion that, “the State [sic] should
deny Defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence derived from the stop. Sgt. Hodges had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop based on a driving pattern that was in violation
of Idaho Code 49-637(1).” Id. (emphasis added).
The supplemental briefing by the State, submitted to the magistrate after the motion to
suppress hearing, makes this equally clear: the State maintained its position before the trial court
that it was only arguing reasonable suspicion in support of the stop under the provisions of I.C. §
49-637(1). (Aug. R., pp.5-6.) The sum total of the additional argument provided by the State
within this filing was a single paragraph setting forth:
The State rests its argument in prior briefing and oral arguments from the
hearing. The reference to the bike lane at the hearing was offered to further
bolster the State’s position that the Defendant’s driving pattern was not within
a safe lane of travel and posed a safety risk to the public that amounted to
reasonable suspicion for the stop. The State urges the Court to review the facts
elicited specific to this case as distinguishable from the caselaw cited by Defense
counsel.
Id. at p.5 (emphasis added).
These augmented documents further strengthen Ms. Gonzalez’s arguments on appeal that
the State’s position on appeal—and the district court’s decision reversing the trial court – were
not properly preserved and were actually disavowed in the State’s argument at the hearing. As
was noted in the Appellant’s Brief, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State affirmatively
argued to the trial court that the basis it was putting forward in support of the initial stop was,
4

“reasonable suspicion for an infraction. We’re not talking about reasonable suspicion for
DUI.” (R., p.662 (emphasis added).)
With the augmented documents within the appellate record properly before this Court, the
procedural default rule raised by the State for items missing from the record is now moot given
the correction. Additionally, these items provide further support for Ms. Gonzalez’s argument on
appeal. The district court reversed the magistrate court that granted her motion to suppress based
on a theory that the officer had reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence at the time he
pulled her over. (R., pp.112-13.) However, not only did the State fail to argue this theory before
the trial court, but the record shows the State took the position that this theory was not a basis
upon which they were seeking to oppose the motion to suppress. Not only is the State’s position
within this appeal therefore not properly preserved, this position is likely barred under the
operation of the invited error doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819 (Ct. App.
1993) (noting that party may not complain on appeal of errors that one has consented, induced, or
acquiesced in and that such claims are not reviewable on appeal).

C.

The State’s Argument That It Preserved The Issue Before The Trial Court Of
Whether The Traffic Stop Was Supported By Reasonable, Articulable
Suspicion Of Driving Under The Influence Is Contrary To The Legal
Standards Regarding Preservation Of Issues And Is Affirmatively Disproven
By The Record

The State has further asserted to this Court that, despite the State’s express statement before
the magistrate that they were not arguing that there was reasonable suspicion of driving under the
influence to support the stop of Ms. Gonzalez in this case, the issue was somehow nevertheless

2

For ease of this Court’s reference, the pinpoint citation for this portion of the transcript—as
contained within the Clerk’s Record on appeal—is p.40, Ls.2-5.
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preserved. However, the State’s position contravenes clearly established precedent regarding the
State’s obligation for preservation of issues on appeal.
The State first seeks to assert that the bare fact of Ms. Gonzalez filing a motion to suppress
and challenging the lawfulness of the stop somehow preserves any argument that the State could
have—but did not—make before the trial court. Respondents Brief, pp.8-9. The State’s argument
is contrary to the multiple Idaho Supreme Court Opinions that have repeatedly and consistently
held that the State must both identify and argue its specific position regarding exceptions to the
warrant requirement before the trial court specifically within the context of motions to suppress.
See, e.g., State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585 (2018); State v. Cohagen, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017); State
v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 274-76 (2017). If the act of filing a motion to suppress was
itself sufficient to preserve any and all of the State’s potential arguments on appeal, these cases
would have certainly made that clear and reached a different result.
The second basis upon which the State seeks to argue that its appellate arguments were
somehow preserved for appeal, and therefore appropriate for the district court to render a decision
on, is that there was testimony adduced at the suppression hearing from which the State could
have—although it did not—argue that reasonable suspicion for a DUI investigation existed. See
Respondent’s Brief, p.9. As with its previous argument on preservation, this is contrary to the
standards articulated in recent Idaho Supreme Court for preservation of issues by the State in the
context of motions to suppress. See, e.g., Fuller, 163 Idaho at 590-91, State v. Holland, 135 Idaho
159, 161 (2000). Mere questions touching upon an issue or a few passing references to its subject
matter are not sufficient to find that the issue was actually argued before the trial court. Holland,
135 Idaho at 161.
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More important for this Court, however, is that the Idaho Supreme Court very recently
accepted a petition for review and squarely rejected the position the State us asking this Court to
take regarding preservation of the issues in State v. Wilson, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___, 2021
WL 4397485 (2021)3. Prior to the Idaho Supreme Court accepting review and affirming the trial
court’s order granting the motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals had previously reversed the
trial court in reliance on an argument raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Wilson, 2020
WL 4876845 (Ct. App. 2020).4 There, as here, the State argued that despite presenting a different
ground for reasonable suspicion on appeal than argued at the trial court, the issue was still
preserved by virtue of the facts elicited during the motion to suppress hearing and the court’s ruling
against the State. Id. at 2-3. The Court of Appeals held that because the district court had the
opportunity to address the issue, and the record for the State’s claim on appeal had been developed
(although not argued), this was sufficient; thereafter, the Court of Appeals in Wilson reversed on
the grounds newly argued by the State on appeal. Id. at *2-4.
The Idaho Supreme Court granted the Defendant’s Petition for review and reached the
opposite conclusion regarding whether the State’s claims were preserved. Wilson, 2021 WL
4397485 at *3-5. This is the most recent, and likely among the most directly applicable, of
rejections by the Idaho Supreme Court to the State’s efforts on appeal to avoid the requirement of
preservation of its claims before the trial court—both to preserve the issue and to preserve their
position on the issue: “We take this opportunity to clarify our preservation standards and against

3

The Wilson Opinion has not yet been released for publication within the permanent law reports
as of the writing of this Reply Brief and is therefore potentially subject to revision or withdrawal.
4
Ms. Gonzalez acknowledges that unpublished opinions in Idaho are generally not permitted to
be cited as authority or precedent within Idaho courts. See Rule 15, Idaho Supreme Court
Operating Rules. However, she is including this case solely for the purpose of explaining the
procedural history of the Wilson case, along with the prior position of the Court of Appeals that
the Idaho Supreme Court rejected in rendering its decision.
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reiterate that both the issue and a party’s position on that issue must be presented to the trial court
before we will consider it on appeal.” Id. at *4 (emphasis in the original). Doing so, “‘would
sharply cut against our longstanding and recently reaffirmed policy of requiring parties to present
their arguments to the court below[.]’” Id. at 5 (quoting Cohagen, 162 Idaho at 721) (alteration
in the original).
The Cohagen case, relied on by the Wilson Court in reaching its decision, is also applies to
the State’s efforts in this appeal to press an issue it abandoned before the trial court. By making
an affirmative representation that the State was not relying on reasonable suspicion of DUI as a
basis for the initial detention of Ms. Gonzalez, the State both conceded this claim and—in doing
so—deprived Ms. Gonzalez of an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue in light of this
concession. Accordingly, the present case is similar to State v. Cohagen, where the State conceded
an issue during the trial litigation of a motion to suppress, but then sought to relitigate the very
issue conceded on appeal. 162 Idaho at 721. In Gohagen the Idaho Supreme Court held that, “[t]o
allow the State to change its positions on appeal and argue that the stop was not illegal would
sharply cut against our longstanding and recently re-affirmed policy of requiring parties to present
their arguments to the court below.” Id. Citing to the prior decision in Garcia-Rodriguez, the
Cohagen Court held that the effect of the State’s concession was to preclude the State from raising
this argument on appeal. Id.
Additionally, by conceding that the State was not seeking to justify the initial stop as a
DUI investigation before the trial court, the State effectively removed this issue from the ambit of
disputed issues and thereby prevented Ms. Gonzalez from presenting argument before the trial
court as to why this would not justify the stop. The Idaho Supreme Court has also made clear that
affirming a decision on an alternate ground than that reached by the trial court is only permissible
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both when that theory is actually raised and litigated by the parties, and where doing so would not
“reroute the course of proceedings” from the decision rendered by the trial court. State v. Hoskins,
165 Idaho 217, 221-23 (2019). By this, the Hoskins Court meant that the “affected party must
have the reason and the opportunity to properly respond to the alternate grounds.” Id. at 222. By
affirmatively representing that the State was not seeking to justify the initial detention on the basis
of suspicion of DUI, the State thereby pulled this issue out of those in dispute regarding Ms.
Gonzalez’s motion to suppress. This meant that Ms. Gonzalez had no reason to try to argue against
and respond to a theory that the State had disavowed.
From all of the recent precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court on this issue, it is clear that
the mere presence of testimony within the record, or even passing references to an issue within
that testimony, are not sufficient to preserve the issue on appeal. In addition to this, the State’s
position that this testimony was somehow intentionally elicited by the prosecutor before the trial
court does not appear to be well-founded. See Respondent’s Brief, p.9. While the police officer
may have mentioned in his testimony that he had some suspicion of DUI, the prosecutor did not
specifically “elicit” testimony on the DUI issue: The State’s question was merely, “And why did
you conduct the traffic stop?”. (R., p.595.) Thus, it mischaracterizes the record to state that the
prosecutor intentionally elicited testimony before the trial court regarding DUI when the question
asked was open-ended and it was solely the police officer that tendered a single statement
regarding his subjective suspicions regarding DUI.
Beyond the fact that the State affirmatively represented to the trial court and to opposing
counsel that they were not relying on reasonable suspicion for DUI as a basis to support the initial
stop, other evidence from the record lends additional support to the fact that the State never relied

5

Tr., p.9, Ls.23-25.
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upon suspicion of driving under the influence in its argument to the trial court. In starting out its
concluding argument before the trial court, the prosecutor referenced the Fuller case as being,
“really the operative case” – and this case was argued by both parties exclusively as to the issue of
whether and when a person has committed the offense of failure to maintain a lane of travel. (R.,
p.656.) In fact, the only time DUI is mentioned within the State’s concluding argument at the
evidentiary hearing is when the State argues that DUI is not an issue within the case: “We’re not
talking about reasonable suspicion for the DUI.” (R., p.667.)
Additionally, the supplemental briefing in this case also made clear that the sole dispute
between the parties was whether the traffic pattern police observed provided reasonable suspicion
for failure to maintain a lane of travel, and not DUI. In the supplemental briefing on this issue,
Ms. Gonzalez noted that the State’s argument in support of the initial stop was limited to the theory
of failure to maintain a lane of travel. (R., pp.32-38.) In both the State’s initial memorandum in
opposition to the motion to suppress and—critically—its subsequent supplemental briefing, the
State only hardens the conclusion that this was their only theory of justification for the initial stop.
(Aug. R., pp.3-8.) Notably, the State never mentions driving under the influence at all as a basis
for the initial stop. The sole reference to any DUI investigation by the State comes in a statement
of facts where the State sets out that the DUI investigation occurred after the initial stop occurred.
(Aug. R., p.1.)
The trial court additionally made a specific finding in paragraph 4 of its order granting the
motion to suppress that, “Sgt. Hodges stopped the car for failing to maintain its lane.” (R., p.46.)
That factual finding as to the basis of the stop has not been expressly challenged on appeal as either

6
7

Tr., p.36, Ls.17-21.)
Tr., p.40, L.5.)
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clearly erroneous or otherwise not supported by substantial and competent evidence. See Wilson,
2021 WL 4397485 at *__ (finding it noteworthy that the State raised no challenge on appeal to the
factual findings of the trial court in support of its order granting the motion to suppress).
According to the legal standards that apply to the obligation of the State to preserve both
the legal issues and its position on those issues before the trial court, the State never preserved any
argument before the trial court in support of the idea that the initial stop could have been supported
by reasonable suspicion of a DUI. Rather, they disavowed this position when Ms. Gonzalez’s
motion to suppress was litigated before the magistrate. Because of this, the district court’s opinion
reversing the magistrate solely on a theory never advanced or decided below was erroneous and
should be reversed.
D.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT AFFIRM THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER
ON INTERMEDIATE APPEAL UNDER THE THEORY OF RIGHT
RESULT, WRONG REASON

The State last asks that this Court affirm the district court’s order on appeal under the theory
of “right result-wrong reason” as it relates to whether there was reasonable suspicion that Lainey
Gonzalez was in violation of I.C. § 49-637(1). In doing so, the State relies almost entirely on the
recent Idaho Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Devan, 168 Idaho 242 (Ct. App. 2020). See
Respondent’s Brief, pp.12-16. However, a review of this case and of the trial court’s findings—
which have not been challenged by the State at any stage in this appeal8—reveals that the holding
of Devan is inapposite to the facts of this case and the holdings of Fuller and State v. Neal control
this issue.

8

The State itself refers to the findings of the trial court as “unchallenged findings” within its
brief. See Respondent’s Brief, p.16.
11

The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to
suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014); State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App.
2013). The Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.”
Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also Ellis,
155 Idaho at 587. “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.”
Ellis, 155 Idaho at 587.
“The Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.”
State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The Court “has defined ‘substantial evidence as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance.’” Id. (quoting Evans v. Hara’s, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 478
(1993)).
The two seminal cases from the Idaho Supreme Court on the issue of whether the act of
crossing over a fog line provides reasonable suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 47-637 are State v.
Neal, 159 Idaho 439 (2015) and State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585 (2018). In Neal, the Idaho Supreme
Court made clear that the fog line on a roadway does not of itself mark the edge of a lane of travel,
and that proof of touching such a line without more cannot provide reasonable suspicion of a
violation of I.C. § 49-637(1). 159 Idaho at 444-47. Of particular note to the court was the fact
that there was no allegation here that the defendant was driving on the shoulder of the road,
“therefore, he was still in the roadway.” Id. at 445.
Fuller came fairly shortly on the heels of Neal; the Court reaffirmed Neal’s core holding
and extended it to a case where the officer observed a car not only touch, but cross over, the fog
12

line on a roadway. 163 Idaho at 587-90. Although the Neal Opinion was rendered in the context
of crossing onto, but not over, the fog line, the Fuller Court clarified that there was no meaningful
distinction as to these two sets of facts for purposes of analyzing whether police had reasonable
suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 49-637 on this basis:
Nowhere in Neal did we suggest that the fog line signifies a lane barrier. We were
careful to emphasize that the fog line is not a lane barrier. As recited above, we
clearly explained that the fog line “may or may not even be present on the
roadway; its purpose is not to create a lane boundary but to inform the driver of
the road's edge so that under certain conditions the driver can safely maintain his
or her position on the roadway.” Where the fog line is present, it is not “painted
on the sidewalks, curbs, shoulders, or beyond the roadway's edge.” Instead, the
fog line, if present, is “painted onto the roadway itself.” Were we to accept the
State's argument that the fog line signifies a lane barrier, “the usable portion of
the lane would actually be widening or narrowing depending on whether there is
a line present.” We rejected this result in Neal, and we reject it again here.
Fuller, 163 Idaho at 589–90 (internal citations omitted).
While the crossing of a fog line may serve as a fact to consider within the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 49-637,
the Idaho Supreme Court cases on this issue are consistent in maintaining it is not necessarily proof
of a violation of itself. The Devan opinion from the Idaho Court of Appeals—the primary legal
authority relied on by the State on appeal—does not change this conclusion.
In Devan, in addition to evidence regarding the crossing of a fog line, both passenger tires
crossed from the roadway onto the shoulder area of the road to the extent that the officer testified
it caused him concern for pedestrians or bikers on the shoulder of the road. 482 P.3d at 578. It
was this encroachment on the shoulder of the road coupled with the crossing of the fog line that
formed the basis for the Devan court’s distinction of these facts from those in Neal or Fuller. Id.
at 581-82. The Devan court referred to the driving pattern found by the trial court in that case as,
“encroaching on the shoulder of a roadway used by pedestrians and cyclists[.]” Id. In contrast,
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the undisputed facts found by the trial court in this case show no such encroachment on the
shoulder or departure from the roadway.
The trial court’s factual findings in regard to Ms. Gonzalez’s motion to suppress included
that:
There was no evidence presented that Ms. Gonzalez drove on the shoulder,
sidewalk, curb, or any other right of way that would support the contention
that she failed to drive within a single lane as nearly as practicable. There was
some testimony presented regarding Ms. Gonzalez driving in a bike lane. It is
possible that the bike lane may have amounted to a right of way but that was not
argued or proven at the hearing and the presence of the bike lane was not a factor
Sgt. Hodges considered when stopping the Ms. Gonzalez.
R., p.48 (emphasis added).
These findings are the key distinguishing features of this case when it comes to which line
of authority Ms. Gonzalez’s case falls within. Like Neal and Fuller, the unchallenged facts as
found by the trial court were that Ms. Gonzalez’s observed pattern of driving—and the act of her
crossing the fog line—did not include any evidence that she, “drove on the shoulder, sidewalk,
curb, or any other right of way that would support the contention that she failed to drive within a
single lane as nearly as practicable.” (R., p.48.) Thus, her case is like Neal and Fuller, where
there is no additional proof that Ms. Gonzalez actually left her lane of travel merely by crossing
over the fog line.
The State has not directly challenged these findings at any stage of the appeal. In fact, the
State’s briefing before this Court refers to the “unchallenged findings” of the trial court within its
order granting Ms. Gonzalez’s motion to suppress. However, it is these findings that show why
the trial court acted well within its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards in
granting this motion. These findings demonstrate why Ms. Gonzalez’s case falls within the ambit
of Fuller and Neal, and why the trial court was correct in suppressing the State’s evidence in light
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of the unlawful detention of Ms. Gonzalez. Accordingly, this Court should decline the State's
invitation to affirm the district court on alternate grounds.

CONCLUSION

Ms. Gonzalez respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's Order on
Appeal reversing the trial court's order granting her motion to suppress.

DATED September 28, 2021.

Erin J. Heuring
Attorney for Defendant- Appellant
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